During the initial consultations which took place in the Foreign Ministry after
Mussolini's response was received, these officials -and perhaps other as well about whom we have no information -decided that on principle they would not accede to the decisions of the Ministry regarding the extradition of the Jewish refugees from Croatia. They considered the issue to be one of humanitarian concern, a matter of principle in which they simply could not give in -on a practical level -under any circumstances. They decided to adopt delaying tactics, in the hope that the longer they could put off the implementation of the plan, the more likely it was that it would eventually be abandoned.
This decision was further reinforced upon receipt of a new report from the Italian Legation in Zagreb on August 22, 1942. The report, which was the most detailed and accurate hereto received on the subject, stated that the deportation to Poland (it is noteworthy that until then the indefinite term "territories of the East" has been used) of the remnants of the Jews of Croatia had recently begun; that the deportations were being carried out in special railway cars provided by the Croatian authorities; and that the Croatians even obligated themselves to pay the Germans 30 marks for each Jew who was taken out of the country. The report further stated that the representative of the Vatican in Zagreb, Monsignor Ramiro Marcone, had intervened via diplomatic channels to stop the deportations but his intervention had been futile. It seemed, however, that "Aryans" married to Jews would not be 43 / 13 deported. Besides describing the events, the author of the report also noted that the German Ambassador in Zagreb had once again approached him and demanded that the Jews of Croatia who had fled to Sector B be included in the deportations, stating that the German Government would soon take formal steps in this matter. (The German Ambassador in Zagreb also reported on this step). 10 The picture was thus very clear to the officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry.
They also had already made their own decision and had chosen the tactics which were to be used. Nothing remained to be done except to begin to implement the plan which, of course, required careful coordination between the diplomatic and military elements, and this type of coordination, by its nature, required oral communication, rather than the use of the regular channels. This is what occurred, although clear evidence was also left in writing, which enables us to trace several of the major steps which were taken. It seems that the participants did not insist upon preserving the "conspiratorial" nature of their activities -apparently they did not deem it necessary. This fact is indicative of the extent to which they depended on the widespread support of various military and government circles in this operation.
The first stage of the delaying process are very clearly outline in a confidential summary composed by the staff of "Supersloda", a copy of which was attached to a letter written by Castellani, the liaison officer between the Foreign Ministry and "Supersloda" staff headquarters, to his superiors in Rome. Written on September 11, 1942, Castellani's letter relates that immediately upon his return to Second Army headquarters following his visit to Rome, he met with General Roatta. They discussed the "well-known problem of the Jews", and Castellani learned that "he [Roatta] agrees completely with our point of view". "Supersloda" will therefore reply to General Staff Headquarters in the spirit of the points raised in the summary which was attached, and it would do so "without any undue haste" (see document no. 4).
The summary stated that while "Supersloda" was, naturally, ready to carry out the orders of the General Staff regarding the extradition of the Jewish 10 Poliakov-Sabille, op. cit., p. 166.
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refugees, the staff nonetheless considered it its duty to point out the practical difficulties hindering the execution of this program as well as the political considerations which in their opinion made it necessary to refrain from actually carrying it out. The refugees were very few in number, since most of Croatian Jewry "had been slaughtered by the Ustaša during the previous summer, particularly in the Gospic and Pago camps". The refugees were scattered throughout both parts of Sector B (areas B and C), where the control of the Italian Army was limited to several places. Moreover, even in those locations, the refugees were mixed together with local Jews and Jews from Sector A (who, of course, were not candidates for expulsion). Thus in order to carry out the instructions, it would first be necessary to determine where the refugees were located, their exact number, and who should be handed over. In addition to the great effort involved, which would be totally out of proportion to the number of refugees involved, the extradition of the refugees would cause inestimable damage to the good name and prestige of the Italian Army in Croatia and throughout the Balkans. It would be interpreted as a disavowal of the express obligation assumed by the Italians to ensure that no one would be discriminated against because of their religion or race in the areas under their occupation. Moreover, such a move was also likely to arouse the suspicions of the Serbian population that once the Jews had been extradited they too would be handed over to the "wild men of the Ustaša", a suspicion which might undermine the peace in this area which in any event was far from stable. Finally, the report noted that even though the behavior of the refugees had not aroused any security worries until then, a plan to transfer them to special camps on one of the islands off the coast of Dalmatia had recently been discussed (see document no. 5). From the tone of the report, it is obvious that the writer considered this to be the most practical and desirable solution.
This document sums up the major points which the Foreign Ministry officials and the officers of "Supersloda" agreed would serve as the basis of their attempts to prevent the extradition of the Jews. Indeed, "Supersloda's" response, sent on September 22, 1942 to the General Staff, repeated these same points, albeit more briefly and in a somewhat laconic style. Castellani,
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who two days later sent a copy of this response to the Foreign Ministry, bemoaned the style and the abbreviations, and found it necessary to explain that "the formulation of this response was also very difficult, and the final version was not arrived at until after a series of six drafts" because "General Roatta's position is extremely difficult, and he is constantly preoccupied (and perhaps not unjustly) that his friends in Rome might be given an excuse to depict him as rebelling against the instructions of his superiors". These clearcut comments are evidence of their fear that there were officers in the General Staff whose opinions were contrary to those which had hereto been voiced. (It is possible that this comment also, or mainly, referred to Marshal Ugo Cavallero, the Chief of Staff, who was considered to be decidedly proGerman. In his diary, Ciano labeled him a "servant of the Germans".
According to the documents of the Foreign Ministry, however, one gets the impression that as far as the Jews of Croatia were concerned, Cavallero's position was no different than that of Roatta or his other colleagues).
In late September 1942, the situation was therefore fairly clear. The Italian staff officers in Croatia continued, "without any undue haste", their discussions about plans to concentrate the Jewish refugees in special camps -at that time the inclination was to intern them on one of the islands off the coast of Dalmatia -and they also began taking a census of the refugees. At General Staff Headquarters in Rome, there was no response to "Supersloda" remarks and suggestions, either because they too considered this the wisest way of dealing with the matter, or because they believed that at that time there were more crucial military problems that required their attention. The Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, followed the development of the events with interest, tensely and fearfully awaiting the German response.
They did not have to wait long. At the end of September, Pavelić met with Hitler at German Staff Headquarters and in the course of one of their discussions, the question of the Jews of Croatia was raised. Hitler emphasized that "the Jews are the underground communications channels and the junction points of all the resistance movements" and he demanded that their activities be stopped once and for all. Ribbentrop, who was also present at that discussion, recalled Mussolini's decision concerning the
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This time "Supersloda" did not delay. One day later, on October 13, it sent a strongly-worded response that no one had ever discussed the handing over of the Jews to "the German authorities", thus it was only natural that no Italian officer had issued any "statement" on this matter, neither to the Germans nor to anyone else. It was the Croatians -and not the Germans -who had time and again asked them to hand over the Jews; and it was to them that "Supersloda" had responded that it had to receive explicit instructions from Rome. The Germans' complaint was thus unfounded. As for the census, it had been ascertained that the total number of Jews in Sector B was 2,025, (In his letter of October 15, 1942, to the Foreign Ministry, however, Castellani noted that this figure did not include 1,626 additional refugees who at the time were "in the midst of being transferred from Spalato to Ragusa" -i.e. from Split to Dubrovnik -and for this reason they were not included in the census in either place). What presently had to be determined was how to divide the Jews who had been counted in the census into the various groups -those who were to be handed over to the Croatians and those who were to continue to benefit from the protection of the Italians. In order to do so, "Supersloda" added, it required further instructions from the Foreign Ministry, which would list the exact criteria which were to be used to classify the Jews. At the end, the cable stated that "Supersloda" had not changed its position as outlined in the report of September 22 -that the interests of Italy demanded that the Jews not be handed over. It had also not received any new instructions, since according to the oral instructions given by the Chief of the General Staff Marshal Cavallero to Genral Roatta, "Supersloda" was to refrain from taking any additional action until further notice. In any event, the opinion of "Supersloda" was that the members of the Italian armed forces should not under any circumstances be given the task of extraditing the Jews. If this shameful act had to be carried out, the Croatians should come and collect the Jews themselves.
In the course of the ensuing developments, it became clear that of all the arguments used by "Supersloda" -all of which were of great moral weightthe one which led to the most practical results was "Supersloda's" request that the Foreign Ministry establish the criteria which were to be used in deciding "who was a Croatian Jew". It soon became clear that this question, which at 43 / 18 first glance had seemed so simple, was fairly complicated, since it had to be formulated as follows: "Who was a Jewish refugee residing in Sector B, who was originally from one of the Croatian districts which had not initially been It soon became clear that this matter of "criteria" could serve as very useful ammunition. One could easily find exceptions in the family origins of most of the Jews, and thus it was easy to claim that every case had to be investigated carefully and that the matter could not therefore be completed within a short time, particularly under the difficult wartime conditions. The correspondence concerning these questions went on for a long time, and we need no review the details. It is sufficient to note that immediately after Von Plessen's visit to the Foreign Ministry, the legal advisor of the Ministry was asked to give his opinion as to who could be considered a "resident" -as opposed to a "refugee" -of the areas under the control of the Italian Army, and who could claim Italian citizenship. On the basis of this initial legal opinion, which was dated October 13, 1942, the officials of the Foreign Ministry established a number of guidelines, which were intentionally broad and vague, and which later, with minor revisions in their formulation, became the basis for all subsequent directives. According to these guidelines, a "resident" was generally an individual who had been officially registered in the local population register. As far as being granted Italian citizenship was concerned, however, the following people would also be taken into consideration: individuals born in the area, those who had resided there "for a fairly long time", a person whose relatives (until the third degree) lived there,
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those who had real estate in that area, as well as individuals who had rendered outstanding service to the Italian occupation authorities -even if they did not fulfill any of the above criteria (see document no. 7).
These guidelines were sent to "Supersloda" on October 16, and the Foreign Ministry repeated them verbatim in a cable sent to the General Staff on November 3. Since they were so broad, it is not surprising that the Italian Army authorities in Croatia claimed from time to time that not only was the clarification of the family origin of the Jews a complicated matter that would take a very long time, but that the number of those who in the end would be extradited would, according to all estimates, be very small indeed. Why then all the unnecessary anxiety concerning the matter? The problem is know and is being dealt with, and in the meantime no security problems are envisaged as a result.
Parallel to this approach, which combined both delaying and diversionary tactics, the officials of the Foreign Ministry also attempted other steps which were more suited to their talents as professional diplomats. They began to conduct discussions with the Croatian authorities in Rome and Zagreb, and attempted to convince them to forego their demand for the extradition of the Jews.
Verax, who apparently was personally involved in this activity, mentions a conversation with Stj. Perić, the Croatian Ambassador in Rome, which took place on October 20, 1942. At this time, the ambassador said that his government would be willing to forego its extradition request if the Italian Government were to undertake to transfer these Jews to Italy (to the "old Italian districts", as he defined it, even excluding Sector A, which had been annexed to Italy) and hand over all their property to the Croatians. According to Verax's testimony, Perić added that he personally hoped that the Italian Government would accept this condition "because he is well aware of the fate awaiting those Jews who are deported by the Germans to the territories of the East". This appeal, and similar appeals which were subsequently submitted to the Italians almost every day, confused the Italian officials. They sensed that they were about to be "caught in the act" and that their maneuvers had brought them to a dead-end from which they had to extricate themselves as quickly as possible lest all their efforts came to naught. They therefore set up a small committee which was to come up with a new plan of action that could be endorsed by both Ciano and Mussolini and which, at the same time, would enable those involved to resist pressure from the Germans. camps. The fact that the words "immediately" and "all" were emphasized in the original, is an indication of the importance which was attached to the directive to concentrate the Jews, which was the only important innovation in this plan.
The purpose of this directive was clear. The Italians feared that under the political and military circumstances which had developed, they would find it difficult to continue protecting the Jews who were scattered throughout a very wide area over which they were increasingly losing control. Similarly, it would be difficult for them to continue putting off the Germans' request, without having some new and convincing excuse. The concentration of all the Jews in a few places would tend to facilitate the problem of protecting them and, at the same time, make things a little easier for the Italian diplomats, who could now point to the fact that "practical steps" had already been taken towards carrying out the plan to extradite the Jews. Moreover, thus the current claim of the Germans, that the refugee problem had to be solved immediately, because as 43 / 22 long as they were free the refugees constituted a serious security risk, could be absolutely refuted. Now the Jews would be held as prisoners in camps, where they could certainly not engage in hostile activities. In the meantime, this move allowed the Italians to again raise the idea of a "trade agreement" with the Croatians, the major points of which were that the refugees would hand over their property to the Croatians if the latter would forego their demand for the refugees' extradition. (On this matter see below, regarding the discussion between Roatta and Mussolini in late November). In essence, however, these contacts and discussions were merely a matter of tactics, and few people believed that they would actually lead to any practical developments.
In the meantime, new facts were being created at a dizzying pace. On The text which was delivered to Von Bismarck was not exactly identical with the one sent earlier to "Supersloda".
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Yet it is not the difference in the details, but rather the difference in tone which is noteworthy. The document given to the Germans stressed the fact that all the Jews, regardless of their origin, had been interned and therefore there was no reason to fear that they might engage in hostile activities in the future. In the letter that was sent to "Supersloda" on November 17, on the other hand, the Marquis d'Ajeta emphasized the fact that because all the Jews had been rounded up without any prior screening, the Italian authorities now had to undertake exhaustive investigations in order to ensure that the Jewish "residents" would not be denied their rights, while remaining fully conscious of "the consequences which these clarifications are likely to bring about". Indeed, the extensive correspondence on this issue indicates that the officers of "Supersloda" took this remark very seriously, and whenever they thought that there was any These two directives, besides confirming the earlier policies, also contained two important innovations -first and foremost, that at least in the foreseeable future, none of those rounded up would be extradited, not even those who would be classified as "refugees"; the second was that for the first time the possibility was raised -to be more exact, the possibility was not ab initio 27 Letters of "Supersloda" to the Italian Foreign Ministry, November 3, 5, and 20; December 13, 14, and 16, 1942, AIFM. 28 Report of Castellani to the Foreign Ministry, December 3, 1942, AIFM.
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denied -that some day in the future the problem of the refugees would be solved by transferring them to Italy. This possibility was, in fact, never realized, and fortunately so, for it is very doubtful whether most of the refugees would have eventually been saved (as they were in Yugoslavia) had they been sent to Italy.
A few days later, on December 9, Von Bismarck once again visited the Foreign Ministry to ask his by-now standard question concerning the extradition of the Jewish refugees in Croatia. This time, however, he also offered a new suggestion. His government understood, he said, the severe difficulties involved in transferring thousands of Jewish refugees through territory in which "bands of rebels" were active. He therefore proposed that these Jews be transferred by sea to Trieste and from there straight to Germany.
It was clear that in this manner the Germans intended to forcefully present their demand. The Italian officials were startled by this suggestion and were not able to offer any response on the spot, except to mutter that technical difficulties, such as the lack of boats, would prevent the implementation of this proposal.
Apparently Von Bismarck accepted this response and did not react. 29 Nevertheless, the officials of the Foreign Ministry were worried by the tone of the new German proposal and a few days later, upon their own initiative, they contacted the German Embassy in Rome and reported once again that the staff of the Italian Army in Croatia had been ordered some time ago to round up all the Jews "in a small number of concentration camps", and that they were presently under the strictest possible surveillance. 30 For several weeks after this answer, there is little information on the diplomatic activity regarding the fate of the Jewish refugees from Croatia.
Perhaps it is only coincidental that few documents from the months January- O.K., I was forced to give my consent to the extradition, but you can produce all the excuses that you want so not that no even one Jew will be extradited.
Say that we simply have no boats available to transport them by sea and that by land there is no possibility of doing so. 33 Thus the conversation ended -according to the testimony of Colonel Carlà, who heard the details from General Robbotti. Even if we assume that here and there the two witnesses embellished the description, the basic content of the testimony is undoubtedly accurate. It is confirmed by Verax, 34 and various details concerning General Robbotti's trip to Rome, such as the date and its general purpose, are confirmed by a cable sent to him by General Ambrosio inviting him to the meeting. 35 The German pressure, therefore, bore no fruit, even when applied at the 
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There is room, however, to dwell upon the significant changes which occurred in the condition and the status of the Jewish refugees during the short period they were in Arbe, as a result of the political developments that occurred in Italy at the time. During these forty-five days, the general political framework in Italy was radically altered and simultaneously, the condition and status of the Jews in Italy and in the Italian-occupied areas, and especially that of the Croatian Jews interned in the Arbe camp, also changed. The question which now confronted the new Italian Foreign Minister Guariglia, the officials of the Foreign Ministry, and the officer of "Supersloda" was no longer how to evade the pressure of the Germans to hand over the refugees, but rather how to free these Jews from the camp without endangering their lives, at a time when releasing them might very well constitute a death trap for them, especially if in 39 Romano, op. cit., p. 70.
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the future the Italian Army would be forced to retreat from the areas it had hereto occupied in Croatia.
The subject was discussed at length by the military and political authorities both in Rome and in Croatia. The officer of "Supersloda" again proposed that the refugees, or at least part of them, such as the women and children and men with professions that might benefit the Italian economy, be transferred to The Foreign Ministry attributed particular importance to this document as is evident from the fact that on the very day it sent the cable to "Supersloda", it also sent a copy to the branch of the Ministry of the Interior which dealt with matters of demography and race (Direzione Generale Demografia e Razza), and which had been in charge of implementing the racial laws against the Jews since 1938. Needless to say, the Foreign Ministry had hereto not kept this branch informed of the steps taken in the matter of the Jewish refugees of Croatia, and one may assume that it often had to make special efforts to ensure that the information would not reach them. Now, however, times had changed. The project to save the Jews no longer had to be kept secret, and the officials of the Foreign Ministry found it useful to keep their "colleagues" in the Ministry of the Interior informed of this new situation, "no matter what happens" as they explicitly stated in the accompanying letter, and in order to warn them in clean and unambiguous terms that they should not intervene in the matter. 40 Letters of "Supersloda" to the Foreign Ministry, July 28 and August 29, 1943, AIFM.
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The cable of the Foreign Ministry instructed the Italian General Staff in Croatia that "Croatian Jews should not be released [from the camps] and are not to be abandoned in the hands of strangers without some sort of protection [thus being] exposed to potential acts of retaliation, unless they themselves prefer to be released and to be sent out of our area of occupation". At the same time, the Italians should prevent these refugees from coming "en masse" to Italy, in the wake of the Italian Army, if it would be forced to retreat, and therefore they must see to it that even in such a situation the Jewish refugees should be able to stay on the island of Arbe, where they would have "adequate protection". In the meantime, the army authorities could begin dealing with each case individually, in a friendly manner, in order to find individual solutions -all, of course, in accordance with the limitations imposed by the difficult conditions of the time.
As for the policy adopted by the Foreign Ministry in regard to the Jewish problem, the author of the cable asserts that "the racial policy which was adopted in Italy never prevented us from preserving those humanitarian principles which are an indelible part of our spiritual patrimony. Today more than ever we are commanded to preserve them. It is nonetheless desirable, from a political point of view as well, that this position be properly presented and made known".
Two elements, which complemented each another, thus influenced the establishment of the Ministry's policy -the humanitarian principle, which the author of the cable and his colleagues certainly believed in sincerely and wholeheartedly, and political interests, which they were aware of and were anxious to fulfill. How fortunate that an elevated moral principle and an important national interest should coincide in this case.
In reality, however, it soon became clear that the matter was much more complex than it had originally been considered. The "Supersloda" officers did not contest the moral principles which were the basis of the Foreign Ministry's directives, and they certainly were willing to serve the interests of their country. As individuals who were in close proximity to the events, however, they fully realized that no guarantee or promise would be of value to the Thus, for the Jewish internees in the Arbe camp, the day of liberation was one of great danger. It was, however, the day on which, for the first time since the beginning of the war, they were given an opportunity to cease being powerless and persecuted refugees and to become the masters of their own fate. For the first time, they were free to organize, to make their way to the areas which had already been liberated by the partisans, and to participate in the struggle against the common enemy.
Of the Jews who were in the Arbe camp at that time -2,661 according to the Italian sources and approximately 3,500 according to Dr. Romano's testimony -only 204 individuals, mainly elderly and sick people, decided to remain where they were. They were captured by the Germans, transferred by sea to
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Trieste and from there were deported to Auschwitz. 41 The rest set out to join the partisans. Some were organized in a special Jewish unit, the Fifth an indication of a profound distortion in our thinking regarding the period of the Holocaust. The logical and natural question is not, "Why did so and so refuse to participate in cold-blooded murder or even try somehow to stop it?" but rather "How was it that so many people, and even entire nations, directly or indirectly sanctioned such deeds?" It is true that one cannot understand the history of a period without comprehending its internal logic and specific nature, but the criteria by which one measure human behavior cannot be arbitrarily changed to suit the character of this or that period, and it certainly cannot be made to suit the value system which governed the actions of the Nazis. Basic and universal moral norms are always binding, even in times of crisis, even when the majority of mankind ignores them, and the devotion to these norms requires no explanation. All the arguments which the officer of "Supersloda" used so frequently in their appeals to the General Staff to justify their opposition to the extradition of the Jews, were basically true. Perhaps they at times embellished them a bit, or even a lot, but they certainly believed that they were true. Beyond the 43 / 42 subjective sensitivity of the Italians, who regarded themselves as the weak and deprived partner of the Axis who had been shunted aside due to the Nazis' tremendous power, there were legitimate political interests, which dictated that the Italians not accede to the demands of the Germans and the Croatians to extradite the Jews, and the officers of "Supersloda" understood this very well.
At the same time, whoever thinks that the episode of the rescue of the Jewish refugees of Croatia can be explained solely on the basis of diplomatic interests errs. Soldiers and civilians on all levels participated in the rescue work and almost everyone regarded the issue first and foremost as a humanitarian problem, which had to be solved for reasons of conscience, which were beyond political considerations.
In view of the enormity of the tragedy which befell the Jews of Yugoslavia, this episode naturally seems quite insignificant. It was, however, a small episode in which a great deal of humanitarianism was revealed, and it is in this light that it should be evaluated, without the broader context of the rescue activities undertaken during the period of the Holocaust. 
